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Abstract. This study considers a simple variation of the voter model with two
competing parties. In particular, we represent the case of political elections, where
people can choose to support one of the two candidates or to remain neutral. People
operate within a social network and their opinions depend on those of the people
with whom they interact. Therefore, they may change their opinions over time, which
may mean supporting one particular candidate or none. Candidates attempt to gain
people’s support by interacting with them, whether they are in the same social circle
(i.e. neighbors) or not. In particular, candidates follow a strategy of interacting for a
time with people they do not know (that is, people who are not their neighbors). Our
analysis of the proposed model sought to establish which network strategies are the
most effective for candidates to gain popular support. We found that the most suitable
strategy depends on the topology of the social network. Finally, we investigated the
role of charisma in these dynamics. Charisma is relevant in several social contexts,
since charismatic people usually exercise a strong influence over others. Our results
showed that candidates’ charisma is an important contributory factor to a successful
network strategy in election campaigns.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb
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1. Introduction
In the last years, opinion dynamics [1] has attracted the attention of many scientists
and several models, to study the formation and the spreading of opinions, have been
developed (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]). In these dynamics, interactions among individuals
and the topology of their network play a fundamental role [1, 8, 9]. One of the most
simple models of opinion dynamics is the voter model [10, 3, 11, 12]. The latter describes
a set of agents that change opinion over time by interacting among themselves. The
voter model allows to represent the evolution of a population toward consensus in the
presence of different opinions. In general, from a physical perspective, by this model it
is possible to identify phase transitions in the system, as from a disordered state to an
ordered one [13, 14]; although as shown in [15] also non-linear dynamics, that entails
the system reaches a final phase characterized by the coexistence of different opinions,
can be introduced. Moreover, the voter model can be implemented in several ways,
with the aim to catch a particular character or behavior of real systems, as political
elections [16, 17, 18] and, more in general, competitions [19, 20, 21]. In this work, we
introduce a variant of the classical voter model, putting our attention on the case of
political elections, in order to study the best strategies to gain the popular consensus.
In the proposed model, there are two competitors (or candidates) that try to convince
a community of agents. In turn, agents are neutral or they have a preference for one
competitor. Therefore, we consider a system with three possible opinions [22]. Agents
are arranged in a network and they change opinion over time, by considering those of
their neighbors. During the evolution of the system, competitors try to affect the opinion
of agents by defining temporal connections with them. In particular, agents temporarily
connected with competitors consider them as normal neighbors while compute their next
opinion. Therefore, each competitor considers very important to identify best agents
for generating these temporal connections. In this context, best agents are those that
allow to increase the candidate’s consensus as fast as possible in the whole population.
It is worth to note that the described dynamics is based on the structure of underlying
adaptive networks [23, 24, 25]. We perform a comparison among different network
strategies, used to perform the selection of agents. Results of numerical simulations show
a relation between the best strategy and the topology of the agent network. Moreover,
we investigate whether the definition of network strategies should consider also the
competitors’ charisma, as this quality is considered fundamental in social contexts. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the proposed model,
for studying network strategies to gain the popular consensus. Section 3 shows results
of numerical simulations. Finally, Section 4 ends the paper.
2. The Model
We introduce a simple variant of a voter model with two competitors, e.g., two
candidates during an electoral campaign. Competitors aim to gain the popular consensus
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in a population of agents. In turn, agents are arranged in a network and they can interact
with their neighbors. Moreover, each agent has an opinion, i.e., it can be neutral or
to have a preference for one competitor. Opinions are mapped to states, hence agents
in the state 0 are neutral, whereas agents in the state 1 and 2 have a preference for
the competitor 1 and 2, respectively. Although three-state voter models have been
already analyzed by other authors (see [26]), usually classical implementations consider
only two opinions, i.e., the two-state variant is much more studied. Agents change
opinion over time by considering those of their neighbors (obviously, competitors never
change opinion). At time t = 0, all agents are in a neutral state (i.e., 0), with the
exception of the two competitors that are in the state 1 and 2, respectively. Then,
at each time step, agents change their state (i.e., opinion) according to the following
transition probabilities:
px→y = σy
px = 1−
2∑
i=0|i 6=x
σi
(1)
with px → y transition probability to change from the xth state to the yth state and
px probability to remain in the same state. The value of σy is computed as σy = ny/nt,
with ny number of neighbors in the state yth and nt total number of neighbors (i.e., the
degree of the agent). Eventually, the summation to compute px considers the densities
σi of neighbors having all the feasible states different from the xth state. In so doing,
at each time step, the agents’ states are defined by using a weighted random selection
with the transition probabilities (Eq. 1) used as weights. Therefore, the evolution of the
system is described by the following equations:
N0(t+ 1) = N ·

N∑
i=1|oi 6=0
σi0(t)−
 N∑
i=1|oi=0
σi1(t) + σ
i
2(t)
+N0(t)
N1(t+ 1) = N ·

N∑
i=1|oi 6=1
σi1(t)−
 N∑
i=1|oi=1
σi0(t) + σ
i
2(t)
+N1(t)
N2(t+ 1) = N ·

N∑
i=1|oi 6=2
σi2(t)−
 N∑
i=1|oi=2
σi0(t) + σ
i
1(t)
+N2(t)
(2)
with Nx number of agents in the xth state and
∑
i=1|oi=x that indicates the ith agent
having a state oi equal (or different) to x. Competitors do not change their state and
they try to gain the consensus of the population. In particular, they generate temporal
connections with agents that are not their neighbors, with the aim to affect the value
of their transition probabilities. These temporal connections last only for one time step
and each competitor generates, every time, a number of temporal connections equal to
its degree (i.e., the number of its neighbors). Therefore, agents temporarily connected
with a competitor compute their transition probabilities as follows:
px→y = σty (3)
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px = 1− px→y (4)
with σty temporal density of neighbors in the yth state (i.e., the state of the competitor
that contacted the agent), computed as:
σty =
ny + 1
nt + 1
(5)
In so doing, the equations to describe the evolution of the system become:
N1(t+ 1)
T = N1(t+ 1) + k1 ·

k1∑
j=1
σ
tA1[j]
1 (t)
− k2 ·

k2∑
j=1|oj=1
σ
tA2[j]
2 (t)

N2(t+ 1)
T = N2(t+ 1) + k2 ·

k2∑
j=1
σ
tA2[j]
2 (t)
− k1 ·

k1∑
j=1|oj=2
σ
tA1[j]
1 (t)

N0(t+ 1)
T = N −N1(t+ 1)T −N2(t+ 1)T
(6)
with Nx(t+1)
T number of agents in the xth state, considering the temporal connections,
and k1, k2 degree of the competitor 1 and 2, respectively. The exponent of σ
t
x in Eq. 6,
i.e., Ax [j], represents the jth agent among those selected by the xth competitor, for
generating temporal connections at time t. During the electoral campaign, at each time
step, competitors have to select the most useful agents to generate temporal connections.
In order to perform this selection, competitors can use one of the following network
strategies:
• S0. Random selection;
• S1. Random weighted selections, using the degree of agents as weights;
• S2. 2nd degree connections: agents at distance 2 (i.e., neighbors of their neighbors);
• S3. 3rd degree connections: agents at distance 3.
Figure 1 shows an example where two competitors generate a temporal connection by
using the strategy S2 and the strategy S3, respectively. Strategies S0 and S1 can
be defined as “global strategies”, as competitors consider the whole network to select
agents. Moreover, by using the strategy S1, agents with high degree have a higher
probability to be selected. On the other hand, strategies S2 and S3 can be defined as
“local strategies”, as competitors select agents by considering only the small portion
of the network around them (i.e., friends of friends, and so on). In order to evaluate
whether a best network strategy can be identified, among those listed above, we analyze
the proposed model by using scale-free networks and small-world networks to connect
the agents.
3. Results
We performed many numerical simulations of the proposed model with the aim to
identify the best network strategy to gain the popular consensus. Agents have been
arranged in scale-free networks, generated by the Barabasi-Albert model (BA model
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Figure 1. Two competitors (i.e., red and green nodes) generate a temporal edge,
indicated by a dotted line, following a strategy: the red node uses the strategy S2 (i.e.,
it selects 2nd degree connections), whereas the green node uses the strategy S3 (i.e.,
it selects 3rd degree connections).
hereinafter) [27], and in small-world networks, generated by the Watts-Strogatz model
(WS hereinafter) [28]. In particular, to achieve small-world networks, we start from a 2-
dimensional regular lattice with 6 neighbors per node, then we rewire with probability
β = 0.1 each edge at random. Finally, both kinds of network (i.e., scale-free and
small-world) have a number of agents N = 104, provided with an average degree
〈k〉 = 6. Moreover, we performed further simulations in scale-free networks with
N > 104, to observe the effects caused by the presence of a greater number of hubs
–see Appendix. We recall that scale-free networks, generated by the BA model, have
a degree distribution P (k) characterized by a scaling parameter γ ≈ 3. In order to
compare network strategies, we consider the number of agents that have a preference
for each competitor and the number of neutral agents. In particular, we analyze the
variation of the density ρ of agents, in these three states, over time. In Figures 2
and 3, we report the comparison among four different simulations, performed on scale-
free networks and small-world networks, respectively. A first information, achieved
analyzing the curves (ρ, t), representing agents in different states, is that the number
of neutral agents falls to zero after about 5.5 · 103 time steps in scale-free networks and
after about 1.2 · 104 time steps in small-world networks. After that, in both kinds of
network, the system seems to reach a steady-state, characterized by small fluctuations of
densities between the two states 1 and 2. Moreover, in the curves (ρ, t), we identify two
important points, called T1 and T2. These points constitute the intersections between
the density of neutral agents and those of agents in the other states. The point T1 is the
intersection between neutral agents and agents with the preference for the competitor
1, whereas T2 is the intersection between neutral agents and agents with the preference
for the other competitor (i.e., the 2). As discussed below, points T1 and T2 are useful
to compare the network strategies.
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Figure 2. Comparison among the density of agents in the state 0 (labeled as N
in the legend, i.e., neutral agents), in the state 1 (labeled as C1 in the legend, i.e.,
Competitor 1) and in the state 2 (labeled as C2 in the legend) over time, performed on
scale-free networks. Results are averaged over 20 different realizations. a) Competitor
1 uses the strategy S0 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S1. b) Competitor 1 uses
the strategy S1 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S2. c) Competitor 1 uses the
strategy S1 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S3. d) Competitor 1 uses the strategy
S2 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S3.
3.1. Comparison among network strategies
A useful parameter, to compare network strategies, is the difference of densities ∆ρ
between agents in the state 1 and agents in the state 2, over time –see Figure 4. The
topology of the agents network seems to play a crucial role, as we observe by comparing
results shown in panels c and d of Figure 4, related to scale-free networks and small-
world networks, respectively. In particular, the strategy S2 is better than the strategy
S3 in scale-free networks, but just the opposite occurs in small-world networks (i.e., the
strategy S3 is the best one). Therefore, we computed the average value of δρ, comparing
all strategies in both kinds of networks –see panel a of Figure 5. As discussed before,
the points T1 and T2 of diagrams (ρ, t) can provide an information about the speed of
competitors in the earning of the global consensus. In particular, as shown in panel b
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Figure 3. Comparison among the density of agents in the state 0 (labeled as N in the
legend, i.e., neutral agents), in the state 1 (labeled as C1 in the legend, i.e., Competitor
1) and in the state 2 (labeled as C2 in the legend) over time, performed on small-world
networks. Results are averaged over 20 different realizations. a) Competitor 1 uses
the strategy S0 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S1. b) Competitor 1 uses the
strategy S1 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S2. c) Competitor 1 uses the strategy
S1 and competitor 2 uses the strategy S3. d) Competitor 1 uses the strategy S2 and
competitor 2 uses the strategy S3.
of Figure 5, we computed the difference T2−T1 for each curve (ρ, t). Values of avg(∆ρ)
highlight that, in scale-free networks, local strategies are better than global ones. In
particular, the best strategy is S2. Instead, considering the global strategies, the S1 is
much more better than S0. On the other hand, in small world networks, we found that
the best strategy is S3, followed by the strategy S1. Therefore, also in this case a local
strategy is more efficient than global ones. It is interesting to note that the strategy
S2 yields optimal results in scale-free networks, but it is the worst strategy (among
those analyzed) in small-world networks. Eventually, comparing the global strategies,
we found that S1 is always better than S0, in particular in scale-free networks, due to
the presence of hubs (i.e., nodes with a high degree). A further information is provided
by the histogram (T2− T1) in panel b of Figure 5. In particular, we can evaluate which
are the faster strategies to gain the popular consensus. As discussed before, after that
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Figure 4. Difference between densities of agents ∆ρ in the state 1 and 2, varying
the strategies adopted by the two competitors. Results are averaged over 20 different
realizations. a) Results achieved in scale-free networks, when the competitors use
strategies S3 and S1, respectively. b) Results achieved in small-world networks, when
the competitors use the strategies S3 and S1, respectively. c) Results achieved in
scale-free networks, when the competitors use the strategies S3 and S2, respectively.
d) Results achieved in small-world networks, when the competitors use the strategies
S3 and S2, respectively.
the number of neutral agents falls to zero, the system reaches almost a steady-state,
with small differences between the density of agents in states 1 and 2. Therefore, as the
time is an important variable in competitions as political elections [29], a good strategy
allows also to obtain the consensus in a few time steps. As result of this analysis, we
found that best strategies, identified in the histogram avg(∆ρ), are also faster than
the other ones. Furthermore, it is worth to highlight that, although S2 is weaker than
global strategies in small-world networks (according to values of avg(∆ρ)), it yields a
fast increasing of global consensus. Hence, in the event the time variable is critical (i.e.,
competitors have a few time to gain the consensus), local strategies are better than
global ones.
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Figure 5. Comparison between results achieved in scale-free networks (blue bars)
and those achieved in small-world networks (red bars), varying the network strategy.
Results are averaged over 20 different realizations. a) avg(∆ρ), i.e., average difference
between density of agents in the two states, 1 and 2. b) Difference between points T2
and T1, indicated in the inset (that shows an enlargement of a diagram (ρ, t)).
3.2. Charismatic Competitors
According to recent studies [30, 31], the politicians’ charisma plays an important role
in the achievement of the popular consensus. In general, the charisma is a quality
deemed relevant in several social contexts as charismatic people are able to exercise
a strong influence on other people. Therefore, here we investigate the proposed
model considering charismatic competitors. In particular, we modify the transition
probabilities of temporarily connected agents as follows:
px→y =

1 if x = 0
1
2
if x 6= 0
(7)
whereas, px, i.e., the probability that the temporarily connected agents remain in the
same state, is always computed by Eq. 4. In so doing, a charismatic competitor gains
always the consensus of neutral agents, whereas it has the 50% of probabilities to gain
the consensus of agents that prefer its opponent. Figure 6 shows results achieved in both
kinds of network (i.e., scale-free and small-world) varying the network strategies played
by competitors. It is interesting to note that the presence of charismatic competitors
strongly affects results. In particular, considering the histogram (∆ρ) (panel a of
Figure 6), global strategies are better than local ones in both kinds of network. In
scale-free networks the best strategy is S1, whereas in small-world networks the best
one seems to be S0. Notwithstanding, observing the histogram (T2−T1), we can see that
in scale-free networks there are small temporal differences between strategies. Therefore,
from this point of view, all strategies are similar. Instead, in small-world networks we
found that best strategies are also the fastest ones. Finally, even if we consider the
presence of charismatic competitors, the topology of networks still affects results.
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Figure 6. Comparison between results achieved in scale-free networks (blue bars)
and those achieved in small-world networks (red bars), varying the network strategy
and considering charismatic competitors. Results are averaged over 20 different
realizations. a) avg(∆ρ), i.e., average difference between density of agents in the
two states, 1 and 2. b) Difference between points T2 and T1.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In this work, we analyze network strategies to gain the popular consensus in the presence
of two competitors. We define a simple variation of the voter model with agents that
change opinion according to transition probabilities, computed considering the opinions
of their neighbors. Moreover, we let competitors interact temporarily also with agents
that are not their neighbors, with the aim to affect their opinion. Therefore, as observed
before, the proposed model is based on an adaptive network. In particular, at each time
step, competitors select a number of agents, equal to their degree, to generate temporal
connections. This selection is performed by using a network strategy. Competitors can
choose between global strategies, i.e., random selection and weighted random selection
(to select agents with a high degree), and local strategies, i.e., their 2nd connections
degree and 3rd connections degree. Simulations have been performed by arranging
agents in scale-free networks and in small-world networks. Results highlight that the
topology of networks strongly affects the outcomes of the model. In particular, in scale-
free networks the best strategy to select agents is S2, i.e., 2nd connections degree.
On the other hand, in small-world networks is more efficient the strategy S3, i.e., 3rd
connections degree. In general, we found that local strategies are more advantageous
than global ones in both kinds of network. In particular, although the strategy S2 seems
unfavourable in small-world networks, it is faster than both global strategies. We recall
that the term “fast”, in this context, is used to identify strategies that allow to increase
the global consensus in a few time steps. Furthermore, we performed simulations
considering “charismatic” competitors. We model the charisma of competitors by
using their probability to convince temporarily connected agents. In particular, this
probability is 1 in the event they interact with neutral agents, whereas it is equal to
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0.5 in the event they interact with agents that have a preference for their opponent.
In so doing, we found that global strategies are better than local ones. In small-world
networks both histograms, i.e., ∆ρ and T2 − T1, show that S0 and S1 are better than
local strategies, and moreover, they yield similar results. On the other hand, in scale-
free networks, global strategies are still better than local ones but, from a temporal
perspective, there are small differences, i.e., all strategies allow to convince many agents
in a similar number of time steps. In order to conclude, results highlight that both the
topology of the agent network and the charisma of competitors should be considered to
plan a successful strategy during electoral campaigns.
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Appendix
In this section, we report results of the proposed model achieved by using scale-free
networks with N = 5 · 104 agents. In so doing, we can perform a further evaluation on
the effects of the hubs (i.e., nodes with a high degree) in these dynamics. As indicated
in Figure 7, on a quality level, results are similar to those achieved in smaller scale-free
networks –see Figures 2 and 4. We observe that increasingN (i.e., the number of agents),
the number of time steps to reduce neutral agents to zero increases. In particular, with
N = 5 · 104, the density of neutral agents falls to zero after about 1.8 · 104 time steps,
while with N = 104 it takes about 5.5 · 103 time steps. In Figure 8, we show results
related to parameters avg(∆ρ) and T2 − T1. Also in these diagrams, we found results
similar to those achieved in scale-free networks with N = 104. Therefore, we can state
that also in the presence of more hubs in the agent network (considering the scale-free
configuration), on a quality level, the outcomes of the proposed model are similar to
those achieved in the main analysis.
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